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Setting the Record Straight: Why
Threats of Physical Violence Made
Towards Inmates Violate the Eighth
Amendment
Alyssa M. Knappins*
INTRODUCTION

Avion Lawson was confined at Martin Correction Institution
when he was chased and brutally stabbed by two other inmates
with homemade knives.1 Lawson immediately approached two officers to seek medical attention.2 The officers told Lawson: “You’re
okay, you’re not bleeding enough, they only look like little gashes.
Maybe next time you’ll think about disrespecting our staff and filing your grievances, then we’ll help. Other than that, throw some
dirt on it and go to the house.”3 The horrific incident occurred just
over two weeks after Lawson had twice met with various prison officials for his progress interviews and after the officers threatened
Lawson for filing grievances and complaints.4 For instance, during
the second progress interview, one officer told Lawson that he

* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law,
December 2021; B.S. Criminal Justice, Bowling Green State University. I
would like to thank Professor Emily Sack for her helpful guidance and insight
during the writing process. A special thank you to my family, friends, and
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1. Lawson v. McGee, No. 19-81526-CV-RUIZ, 2020 WL 5822266, at *2
(S.D. Fla. Aug. 28, 2020).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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would have other inmates “beat and stab him to death.”5 These
threats put Lawson in a continuous state of fear of the correctional
officers and his fellow inmates.6
The threats did not end there.7 Following the tragic incident
that left Lawson fearing for his life, threats by officials began to
resurface almost immediately.8 Prison officials told Lawson that if
he continued to file grievances against the correctional officers, “[it]
won’t be pretty,” which indicated future harm would occur if Lawson failed to adhere to what the officers wanted.9 The ferocious attack on Lawson, and the threats that followed, caused Lawson to
suffer from “aching, panic attacks, sleep deprivation, uncontrollable
shaking, nightmares, [and] headaches.”10
Lawson filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that
the officers’ treatment was unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment.11 Unfortunately, the Martin Correction Institute is
in a jurisdiction that has yet to recognize any verbal threat, regardless of the seriousness of the threat, as an Eighth Amendment violation.12 Like many prisoners who are continuously threatened by
correctional officers, Lawson’s complaint will likely be dismissed,
and he will not have the opportunity to challenge the treatment he
faced from the prison officials in court.13
Although the Constitution “does not mandate comfortable prisons,”14 it also does not permit inhumane ones.15 This Comment will
discuss a current circuit split on whether verbal threats of physical
harm made by prison officials can form a basis for an Eighth
Amendment claim. Specifically, this Comment will focus on why
some courts believe such threats can rise to the level of a

5. Id. at *5.
6. See generally id. at *2.
7. See id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at *3.
11. Id. at *1.
12. See id at *1, *9; see also Hernandez v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 281 F. App’x
862, 866 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding “verbal abuse alone is insufficient to state a
constitutional claim”).
13. See generally Lawson, 2020 WL 5822266, at *13.
14. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981).
15. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 30 (1993).
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constitutional violation while others do not.16 This Comment will
argue that prison officials who make threats of physical violence
towards prisoners can violate a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment
rights, because some threats can form the basis of an injury sufficiently serious to constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
To address these Eighth Amendment claims, courts should enact a four-factor analysis for determining whether a threat amounts
to a constitutional violation: (1) repetitiveness of the threat; (2)
credibility of the threat; (3) subject matter of the threat; and (4)
context surrounding the threat. The foregoing factors will help
courts determine which threats made by a prison official constitute
cruel and unusual punishment and which threats fail to meet the
stringent requirements needed to prevail on an Eighth Amendment
claim.
Part I of this Comment will paint a general background of the
Eighth Amendment in the context of prisoners’ rights and will explain how the Supreme Court has recognized and analyzed various
Eighth Amendment claims made by prisoners. In Part II, this Comment will examine the current circuit split and explain why some
courts believe threats can cause a serious risk to a prisoner, while
others believe that no threat—regardless of how serious—can ever
rise to a constitutional violation. Part III will argue that the courts
that recognize a constitutional violation are correct because prison
officials act with the deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of
serious harm needed for cruel and unusual punishment when making threats of physical violence. This Part will further analyze the
various psychological and physical harms an inmate may experience due to threats of physical violence, such as: emotional distress,
gastrointestinal problems, cardiovascular damage, headaches, and
chronic pain. Lastly, Part IV will propose a four-factor analysis for
courts to adopt to carefully determine which threats meet the

16. In addition to the Eighth and D.C. Circuits, the Fourth Circuit has
recognized that verbal threats of physical violence may rise to an Eighth
Amendment violation. See, e.g., Hudspeth v. Figgins, 584 F.2d 1345, 1348 (4th
Cir. 1978) (“A threat of physical harm to a prisoner if he persists in his pursuit
of judicial relief is as impermissible as a more direct means of restricting the
right of access to the courts.”). Alternatively, some circuits, such as the Fifth
Circuit, join the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits by finding “mere words” or “idle
threats” will never rise to a Constitutional violation. See, e.g., Lamar v. Steele,
693 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1982).

116 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:1
threshold for a constitutional violation. This Comment will conclude that it is critical for the Supreme Court to find that threats of
physical violence are Eighth Amendment violations, because doing
so would not only permit inmates to bring suits challenging mistreatment but will also create clearly established law to prevent
qualified immunity from barring recovery.
I.

BACKGROUND OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AS APPLIED TO
PRISONER CLAIMS

The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits, in relevant part, “cruel and unusual punishments.”17 Courts
are aware that “[r]outine discomfort is a part of the penalty that
criminal offenders must pay, so only extreme conditions that deprive inmates of a ‘civilized measure of life’s necessitates’ violate
the Eighth Amendment.”18 Claims of cruel and unusual punishment generally relate either to excessive force or conditions of confinement.19 Courts have unanimously considered the issue of
threats as implicating conditions of confinement rather than excessive force.20 Therefore, this Comment will likewise adopt that approach and employ its analytical framework.
In the twentieth century, the Supreme Court decided three
cases regarding prison conditions that developed the current

17. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
18. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992).
19. See generally Irving v. Dormire, 519 F.3d 441, 446 (8th Cir. 1992); see
also Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. (citing Whitley v. Albers, 457 U.S. 320, 327 (1986).
In Hudson, a prisoner alleged his Eighth Amendment rights were violated after he received a physical beating from a state correctional officer. Hudson,
503 U.S. at 4. Hudson suffered minor bruises, facial swelling, loosened teeth,
and a cracked dental plate. Id. The Court held that use of excessive physical
force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual punishment even
though the inmate does not suffer serious injury. See id. at 9. Excessive force
claims require a showing of “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id. at
5 (quoting Whitley. 457 U.S. at 319). Courts recognize that force is sometimes
required in prison, so prison officials will only be liable if they are unjustified
in using force or they are using it maliciously and sadistically. Id. at 12 (Stevens, J., concurring (citing Whitley, 457 U.S. at 320–21)). In other words,
prison officials must be justified to use the force and cannot use “force greater
than de minimis, or any use of force that is ‘repugnant to the conscience of
mankind.’” Id. at 9–10 (quoting Whitley, 457 U.S. at 327).
20. See id. at 1; see also Irving, 519 F.3d 441.
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standard necessary to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim.21
Starting with Wilson v. Seiter in 1991, the Supreme Court held that,
in order to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must
prove that a prison official acted with both a subjective and objective element of culpability.22 The Court held that an inmate is required to show that a prison official acted with “deliberate indifference” in order to meet the subjective element of an Eighth
Amendment claim.23
In Helling v. McKinney, the Supreme Court recognized that a
plaintiff need not have a current injury, and just a showing of a
potential future injury may be deemed sufficiently substantial to
satisfy the objective element.24 Objectively speaking, an inmate
must demonstrate the deprivation of rights was or will be a “sufficiently serious” injury to a reasonable person.25 So long as the
plaintiff can demonstrate that an injury was or will be sufficiently
substantial to a reasonable person, the plaintiff will satisfy the objective element.26
Lastly, in Farmer v. Brennan in 1994, the Supreme Court held
that a prison official is not liable “unless the official knows of and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”27 Farmer
officially set out the deliberate indifference standard used today
which requires a showing that the defendant was aware of a

21. See generally Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
22. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298.
23. Id. at 303. Justice Powell concluded: “Whether one characterizes the
treatment received by [the prisoner] as inhuman conditions of confinement,
failure to attend to his medical needs, or a combination of both, it is appropriate
to apply the ‘deliberate indifference’ standard articulated in Estelle.” Id.
24. See Helling, 509 U.S. at 35. In Helling, the inmate sued prison officials
alleging that his exposure to environmental tobacco smoke posted an unreasonable risk to his heath which arose to the level of cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 28. The Court held “[i]t would be odd to deny an injunction to
inmates who plainly proved an unsafe, life-threatening condition in their
prison on the ground that nothing yet had happened to them.” Id. at 33.
25. See id. at 34.
26. See id.
27. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); see also Brenna HelppieSchmieder, Note, Toxic Confinement: Can the Eighth Amendment Protect Prisoners from Human-Made Environmental Health Hazards? 110 NW. L. REV.
647, 657–58 (2016).
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substantial risk of a serious harm and that such defendant drew
from the inference by acting upon it.28
Although the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on whether
threats of physical violence rise to an Eighth Amendment violation,
the circuits that have ruled on the issue are split.29 Six have held
that verbal threats alone are insufficient to state a claim for cruel
and unusual punishment because they believe no threat—regardless how serious—can cause a substantial risk of harm to an inmate
which is required to meet the objective element of an Eighth
Amendment claim.30 On the other hand, three circuits—the
Eighth, Fourth and D.C.—have recognized that some verbal threats
can rise to a constitutional violation.31
Courts are divided on the issue, and until the Supreme Court
explicitly takes a stance on the issue, prisoners will struggle to overcome qualified immunity and as a result, will face greater obstacles
in recovering from their injuries.32 In order for inmates to be able
to bring suit, the Supreme Court must first take the issue up and
find threats of physical violence may constitute an Eighth Amendment claim.33 Without the Supreme Court ruling in favor of recognizing a constitutional violation, many prisoners in the United

28. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
29. The First and Tenth Circuit have yet to take a stance on the issue.
30. The Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits
have all held that mere verbal threats are never enough to constitute an Eighth
Amendment violation. See Salahuddin v. Harris No. 82 Civ. 8527 1986 WL
9791, at *2 (S.D.N.Y 1986) (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2nd
Cir. 1973)); Maclean v. Secor, 876 F.Supp. 695, 697 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987); Evans v Wilson, 12 F.3d
1100 (7th Cir. 1993); Morgan v. Stansberry, 2019 No.:1:18-CV-256 2019 WL
6742915, at *9 (E.D. Tenn. 2019) (citing Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950 (6th Cir.
1987)); Bender v. Brumley, 1 F.3d 271, 274 n. 4 (5th Cir. 1993).
31. See Irving v. Dormire, 519 F.3d 441, 448–49; see also Chandler v. D.C.
Dept. of Corr., 145 F.3d 1355, 1360–61 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
32. Qualified immunity grants government officials performing governmental functions immunity from civil suits. In order to prevent a governmental official from being shielded by qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show
the official violated “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982). In this context, a reasonable person in a prison officials’ situation may not be aware of a clearly established law prohibiting the use of verbal threats of physical violence because the Supreme Court has yet to take a
stance on the issue. Id.
33. See generally id.
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States will be barred from recovery.34 Moreover, until the Supreme
Court holds the threat of physical violence is a constitutional violation, prisoners will face greater obstacles in recovering from their
injuries because the lack of clearly established law will permit officers to claim qualified immunity.
II. THE CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT

A. Circuits That Have Recognized Threats of Physical Harm as
Eighth Amendment Violations
There are currently three circuits that have recognized constitutional violations regarding the use of threats of physical violence.35 First, the Eighth Circuit recognizes that some threats of
physical harm made by prison officials can form the basis of an
Eighth Amendment violation.36 In Irving v. Dormire, the defendant
prison officials offered other inmates cigarettes and fifty dollars to
assault Irving over a period of several months.37 In addition, the
prison officials directly threatened to kill Irving or “have him
killed,” telling Irving they would “get him sooner or later,” and that
they wanted him dead.38 In this case, the defendants relied on a
prior Eighth Circuit case, Hopson v. Fredrickson, arguing that verbal threats are insufficient to violate the Constitution.39 The prison

34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Irving, 519 F.3d at 449.
37. Id. at 445. The prison officials also opened Irving’s cell door allowing
other inmates to attack Irving. Id. The attack resulted in an injured jaw and
nose causing breathing problems for nearly two months after. Id. The Court
held that “Hyer and Neff not only failed to take reasonable measures to guarantee Irving’s safety as required by the Eighth Amendment, but they also intentionally brought danger to him.” Id. at 447 (citation omitted).
38. Id. at 445. Irving alleged various instances or threats made by prison
officials. For example, the officer’s alleged conduct in threatening Irving with
a can of pepper spray failed to rise to the level of being objectively credible. Id.
at 444.
39. Id. at 448. In Hopson, the Eighth Circuit found no Constitutional violation when prison offices seated in the front seat threatened to knock out the
prisoner in the back seat if he did not start talking. Id. (citing Hopson v.
Fredrickson, 961 F.2d 1374, 1378 (8th Cir. 1992)). The Court explained “[t]he
officers did not threaten Hopson’s life, nor did they raise any fist or weapon to
Hopson or otherwise take any action to make the threat seem credible.” Id. at
449 (quoting Hopson, 961 F.2d at 1378–79).
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officials failed to recognize that the Eighth Circuit has made an exception to this general rule when a state official has acted in a “brutal and wanton act of cruelty” even without any physical harm
done.40
The Court explained that Irving’s allegations clearly satisfied
the subjective element because “no legitimate penological purpose
could have been served by defendants’ conduct, and their actions
toward Irving demonstrated a state of mind that was not merely
deliberately indifferent, but also sadistic and malicious.”41 The
Court focused on the fact that the threats here were ongoing in nature and were coupled with affirmative attempts to follow through
with the alleged threats.42 The number of threats made “stronger
confirmations of the threats’ credibility.”43 Irving was left confined
in prison with a constant fear of violence and a risk of serious harm
to his future health.44 Thus, the actions made by the prison officials
were sufficiently serious to implicate the Eighth Amendment given
their ongoing nature and the concrete affirmative efforts to persuade other inmates to assault Irving.45
In addition, the Fourth Circuit has joined the Eighth Circuit in
recognizing that a verbal threat may be sufficient for an Eighth
Amendment violation.46 In Hudspeth v. Figgins, prison officials
threatened an inmate, Hudspeth, by telling him that “they [would]
pay five thousand dollars to an officer to shoot [him] and make it

40. Id. at 448 (citing Hopson, 861 F.2d 1378). In Burton v. Livingston, a
prison official pointed a gun at the prisoner’s head and told him to run as an
excuse to shoot Burton. Id. (citing Burton v. Livingston, 791 F.2d 97, 99 (8th
Cir. 1986)). The Hopson Court recognized this as an Eighth Amendment violation noting that “a prisoner retains at least the right to be free from the terror
of instant and unexpected death at the whim of his . . . custodians.” Id. (quoting Burton, 791 F.2d at 100).
41. Id. at 446. Moreover, the defendants here had previously made three
unsuccessful offers of payments to have other inmates assault Irving, armed
an inmate to assault Irving, and even labeled Irving a “snitch” to encourage
others to assault him. Id. at 449.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 449–50.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Hudspeth v. Figgins, 584 F.2d 1345, 1348 (4th Cir.1978)
(holding that “[a] threat of physical harm to a prisoner if he persists in his
pursuit of judicial relief is as impermissible as a more direct means of restricting the right of access to the courts.”).
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look like an accident.”47 When Hudspeth sought legal recourse, the
officials retaliated by moving him to a different work assignment,
which subjected him to greater risk of physical harm due to his
hearing impairment.48 The Court noted that, insofar as Hudspeth
was indeed fearful for his life, the officials’ threat implicated the
Eighth Amendment.49
Lastly, in addition to the Eighth and Fourth Circuit, the D.C.
Circuit has held that even a single threat of physical harm, if sufficiently serious, can be enough to give rise to an Eighth Amendment
violation.50 In Chandler v. D.C. Department of Corrections, the
Court held that an allegation of a single death threat made by a
guard to an inmate without any further physical harm, can rise to
an Eighth Amendment violation.51 The inmate, Chandler, alleged
that the prison official “made a threat against [his] life.”52 The complaint alleged that the prison official’s threat had caused Chandler
“psychological damage,” which led to nightmares accompanied by
waking up in a “frantic sweat.”53
The Court in Chandler looked to Hudson v. McMillian and
noted that “verbal threats, without more, may be sufficient to state
a cause of action under the Eighth Amendment.”54 In Hudson, Justice Blackmun observed:
It is not hard to imagine inflictions of psychological harm—
without corresponding physical harm—that might prove to
be cruel and unusual punishment . . . [T]he Eighth Amendment prohibits the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
“pain,” rather than “injury.” . . . “Pain” in its ordinary
meaning surely includes a notion of psychological harm.55

47. Id. at 1347.
48. See id.
49. Id. at 1348.
50. See Chandler v. D.C. Dept. of Corr., 145 F.3d 1355, 1361 (D.C. Cir.
1998).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1359.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1360.
55. Id. (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 16 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring)).
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In Chandler, the prison official’s threats led Chandler to believe his life was at risk because the prison official had the capability of carrying out the threat.56 Thus, the D.C. Circuit recognized
that a verbal threat “accompanied by conduct supporting the credibility of the threat” could also rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation.57
B. Circuits That Have Failed to Recognize Threats of Physical
Harm as Eighth Amendment Violations
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit has held that no threat
rises to an Eighth Amendment violation. For example, in Gaut v.
Sunn, a prisoner alleged that prison guards denied him access to
medical care, severely beat him, and threatened to physically harm
him if he sought legal redress for the beating.58 The Court held the
beatings constituted a § 1983 claim, but the threat did not, and concluded that “we find no case that squarely holds a threat to do an
act prohibited by the Constitution is equivalent to doing the act itself.”59 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that verbal threats alone can
never rise to an Eighth Amendment violation.60
Further, in Ferguson v. Pagati, a district court within the
Ninth Circuit found that a correctional officer’s threat to have an
inmate physically harmed failed to rise to the level of a viable
Eighth Amendment violation.61 The inmate alleged that the correctional officer verbally threatened him with physical violence
while he was seeking medical care.62 After receiving medical care
due to “severe chest pains and congestive heart failure,” the defendant “began to shout threats of physical violence and threats to physically harm [the inmate].”63 The prisoner contended that the threat

56. Id. at 1361.
57. Id.
58. Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 924–25 (9th Cir. 1987). The Court looked
to Hawaiian state law in guiding their holding. The Court explained that under Hawaiian law, mere threats may not state a cause of action of an Eighth
Amendment violation. Id. at 925.
59. Id.
60. See Furguson v. Pagati, No. CV 12-00653, 2013 WL 3989426, at *4
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2013). See generally Gaut, 810 F.2d. 923.
61. Ferguson, 2013 WL 3989426 at *2.
62. Id.
63. Id. at *4.
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caused him “severe emotional distress and aggravt[ed] his vulnerable medical condition.”64 The Court reasoned that the prisoner did
not establish an Eighth Amendment violation because he only alleged a single verbal threat with no indications that the threat
would be acted upon by the prison officials.65 Moreover, the court
noted that nowhere in the complaint did the prisoner allege that
the threats made were unusually harsh for a prison setting.66 The
court further reasoned that “it trivialized the [E]ighth [A]mendment to believe a threat constitutes a constitutional wrong.”67
Like the Ninth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit has also found
that threats alone are insufficient to state a constitutional claim.68
In Hernandez v. Florida Department of Corrections, the inmate,
Hernandez, alleged that correctional officers verbally threatened
him with physical violence.69 The court held that Hernandez’s allegations of threats made by prison officials failed to state a claim
because the prison officials never actually carried out those
threats.70 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower
court’s dismissal of the claim reasoning that because the prison officials never acted upon the threats, no harm had been done.71
Lastly, in a district court case within the Eleventh Circuit, Majors v. Clemmons, a prisoner brought suit against the warden of
Santa Rosa Correctional Institution, alleging a violation of his
Eighth Amendment rights, the prisoner purportedly received homophobic threats of physical violence from other prisoners and prison

64. Id. at *2.
65. Id. at *5.
66. Id.
67. Id. at *4 (citing Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding
a prisoner’s claim against prison officials who threatened physical violence not
a sufficient deprivation warranting protection by the Eighth Amendment); see
also Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 564–65 (9th Cir. 2009) (upholding Gaut’s
holding that threats cannot demonstrate constitutional deprivation).
68. See Hernandez v. Fla. Dep’t. of Corr., 281 F. App’x 862, 866 (11th Cir.
2008); see also Edwards v. Gilbert, 867 F.2d 1271, 1273–74 n.1 (11th Cir. 1989).
69. Hernandez, 281 F. App’x at 866.
70. Id. (citing Edwards, 867 F.2d at 1274 n.1 (rejecting a claim that prison
officials “violated their duty of protection or deprived the petitioner of his constitutional rights” based on threats from adult inmates, even if the threats
were distressing)).
71. Id.
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officials.72 The court held that claims of threats of physical violence
made by prison officials were insufficient because “derogatory, demeaning, profane, threatening, or abusive comments made by an
officer to an inmate, no matter how repugnant or unprofessional, do
not rise to the level of a constitutional violation,” and that threats
alone do not cause actual, recognizable harm.73 Thus, the Eleventh
Circuit has consistently held that a threat alone—without physical
harm—does not provide a basis for a cognizable Eighth Amendment
claim.
In contrast to the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, this Comment
argues that verbal threats of physical harm can result in a substantial risk of not only physical harm, but psychological harm as well.
Courts should recognize verbal threats of physical harm to help prevent a substantial risk of serious harm from being disregarded.
III. A VERBAL THREAT OF PHYSICAL HARM CAN RISE TO AN EIGHTH
AMENDMENT VIOLATION

A. Threats From Prison Officials May Create a Substantial Risk
of Harm
A prison official acts with deliberate indifference when he
knows that his action will create a substantial risk of serious harm
and he disregards that risk.74 Not only can threats lead to physical
harm, but such threats can also lead to psychological harm.75 There
is no dispute that being incarcerated does not take away an inmate’s physical and psychological needs and protections.76

72. Majors v. Clemmons, No. 3:19-cv-05051, 2020 WL 5775817, at *1 (N.D.
Fla. Aug. 20, 2020). Although the defendant failed to address the threats he
made against the plaintiff in the motion to dismiss, the court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court noted that
even if the plaintiff tried to bring suit for the prison officials’ threats again,
that claim would again be dismissed. Id. at *5.
73. Id.
74. Calderon-Ortiz v. Laboy-Alvarado, 300 F.3d 60, 64 (1st. Cir. 2002) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.825, 835–40 (1994)).
75. Jens Modvig, Violence, Sexual Abuse and Torture in Prisons, in
PRISONS AND HEALTH, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 19, 19 (Stefan Enggist, Lars Møller,
Gauden Galea & Caroline Udesen eds., 2014).
76. See id.
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Physical Injury

The use of verbal threats of physical harm can lead an inmate
to experience a variety of physical injuries. The anticipation of
physical harm in the face of a threat can trigger physical reactions.77 For example, when an individual is faced with fear, one
may experience an increased heartrate.78 An individual may also
face chronic pain.79 Chronic pain can be defined as “prolonged
physical pain that lasts for longer than the natural healing process
should allow.”80 The use of verbal threats of physical violence may
lead to an inmate experiencing trauma derived from living in a constant fear of the prison official carrying out the threats of physical
violence.
Furthermore, emotional distress can cause irritable bowel syndrome, headaches, cardiovascular damage, gastrointestinal problems, accelerated ageing and can even lead to premature death.81
When an individual experiences a traumatic event, “the nervous
system goes into survival mode and sometimes has difficultly reverting back to its normal, relaxed mode again.”82 When an inmate
is threatened with his life, there is no doubt that this could constitute a traumatic event. When stuck in survival mode, “stress hormones such as cortisone, are constantly released.”83 This can lead
to an increase of blood pressure and blood sugar.84 Many inmates

77. John D. Bessler, Taking Psychological Torture Seriously: The Torturous Nature of Credible Death Threats and the Collateral Consequences for
Capital Punishment, 11 Nᴇ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 1, 87 n.371 (2019).
78. Id.
79. Susanne Babbel, The Connections Between Emotional Stress, Trauma
and Physical Pain, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, (Apr. 8, 2010), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/somatic-psychology/201004/the-connections-betweenemotional-stress-trauma-and-physical-pain [https://perma.cc/8UWW-HKPB].
80. Id.
81. Id. Recent studies have found that “the more anxious and stressed
people are, the more tense and constricted their muscles are, causing the muscles to become fatigues and inefficient over time.” Id. While incarcerated and
experiencing threats of physical violence, it is not unreasonable for an inmate
to develop anxiety and stress. See also Louise Delagran, Impact of Fear and
Anxiety, UNIV. MINN. (Sep. 10, 2021, 1:27 PM), https://www.takingcharge.
csh.umn.edu/impact-fear-and-anxiety [https://perma.cc/AA7S-3QRW].
82. Babbel, supra note 79.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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may perceive threats as a traumatic event and in turn trigger not
only an emotional response, but also a physical reaction to the
threat. These physical injuries and manifestations often derive
from the psychological injuries.
2.

Psychological Injury

Although the Supreme Court has yet to answer the question of
whether psychological trauma alone is sufficient to prevail for an
Eighth Amendment violation, various cases show that courts are
more likely to recognize psychological harm when coupled with
physical harm.85 There is no dispute that psychological harm is not
treated as seriously as physical harm within the prison system.86
Studies have shown that instances of verbal threats of physical violence can affect an individual’s psychological state by causing extreme emotional distress.87 The human body reacts to threats of
violence as “an essential part of keeping us safe.”88 When an individual faces prolonged fear, their psychological state may begin to
deteriorate.89 Once fear is detected, our body releases hormones
which may “slow or shut down functions not needed for survival.”90
Long-term fear can lead to fatigue, clinical depression, and PTSD.91
The use of threats of violence can lead to a physical and

85. See generally Michael B. Mushlin, 1 Rights of Prisoners § 3:1 (5th ed.,
Sept. 2020 update) (tracing the history of aspects of prison life that have been
found unconstitutionally punitive); Note, The Psychology of Cruelty: Recognizing Grave Mental Harm in American Prisons, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1251,
1262 (2015). For example, Courts have historically failed to recognize the psychological harm alone caused by solitary confinement sufficient for a Constitutional violation. Most recently, courts have started to recognize that mental
harm alone may rise to a violation. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1261
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (stating “mental health, just as much as physical health, is a
mainstay of life.”).
86. Bessler, supra note 77, at 70 n. 304.
87. See id at 69–70; see also Todd P. Gordon, Verbal and Physical Threats,
U.S. ARMY (May 1, 2019), https://www.army.mil/article/221106/verbal_and
_physical_threats [https://perma.cc/C4MG-KA5B] (“The most serious verbal
threats are those that are genuine, credible and directed specifically at someone…”).
88. Delagran, supra note 81.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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psychological impact on inmates and can meet the “sufficiently serious” threshold.92
Many cases have discussed the use of verbal threats of physical
harm, including cases of death threats.93 In regard to death
threats, it has been recognized (outside the prison system) that
such threats have profound consequences.94 Credible death threats
or verbal threats of physical harm may lead to the production of
psychological terror to an individual who is already susceptible to
mental health challenges.95 Not only do threats of physical harm
inflict psychosocial terror, but they also inflict trauma and severe
pain and suffering.96 Moreover, it has long been held that death
threats can qualify as acts of torture.97 If death threats have previously been classified as “torture” as a matter of law, then threats
of death or physical injury in the prison system should be classified
as “cruel and unusual punishment.”
Though the Supreme Court has not held that psychological
harm is a sufficient injury needed to show a constitutional violation,
we as a society have recognized that certain threats of physical
92. See generally Substantive Rights Retained by Prisoners, 39 GEO. L.J.
ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 995 (2010).
93. See, e.g., Irving v. Dormire, 519 F.3d 441 (8th Cir. 2008); Chandler v.
D.C. Dep’t. of Corr., 145 F.3d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
94. Bessler, supra note 77, at 4–5 (citing 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DEATH AND
THE HUMAN EXPERIENCE 553 (Clifton D. Bryant & Dennis L. Peck eds., 2009)
(“in general, a death threat is not protected speech if there is intent to follow
through with the threat.”).
95. See id. at 9; see also The Supreme Court and Time on Death Row,
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., (Sept. 10, 2021, 9:42 PM), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row/death-row-time-on-death-row/the-supreme-court-andtime-on-death-row [https://perma.cc/F3XW-JVW6]. Other examples of credible death threats can be seen using the death penalty in the United States.
See id. Although the Supreme Court has not yet held the length of a prisoner’s
tenure on death row is constitutional, Justice Stephen Breyer and former Justice John Paul Stevens have questioned it for many years. See id. For example,
when the Supreme Court declined review in Thompson v. McNeil, Justice Steven wrote “[o]ur experience during the past three decades has demonstrated
that delays in state-sponsored killings are inescapable and that executing defendants after such delays is unacceptably cruel. This inevitable cruelty, coupled with the diminished justification for carrying out an execution after the
lapse of so much time, reinforced my opinion that contemporary decisions ‘to
retain the death penalty as a part of our law are the product of habit and inattention rather than an acceptable deliberative process.’” Id.
96. Bessler, supra note 77, at 12.
97. Id. at 9–10.
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violence can lead to severe psychological harm to the point that society has limited the offender’s free speech. If the Supreme Court
views the harm as so severe that they must restrict one’s First
Amendment rights to free speech, then courts should recognize the
same threats of physical violence as cruel and unusual punishment.
The Supreme Court has explained that “‘true threats’ encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate a
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”98 When a
victim’s fear is reasonable or grounded in reality, the threatening
speech will lose its First Amendment protection.99 A prohibition on
true threats “protects individuals from the fear of violence” and
“from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur.”100
Victims of true threats can experience psychological effects for long
periods of time that can range from mild to severe.101 “The victim’s
stress levels can increase due to his constant state of apprehension
about his personal safety.”102 An inmate often lacks the tools of
obtaining safety because their perpetrator is the prison official responsible for overseeing the inmate.
A prison official should not be precluded from these crucial restrictions just because they hold a position of power. Many prison
officials’ threats may rise to the level of a “true threat.” Likewise,
the threats that constitute a “true threat” are not threats that are
merely “offensive words” or “unpleasantries,” rather, they are
threats to end someone’s life or inflict physical harm.103 Two purposes of making these types of threats are to cause fear and apprehension and “to operate on a particular individual through coercion
or intimidation.”104 When receiving a “true threat,” a prisoner may
98. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003).
99. Bessler, supra note 77 at 18 (citing Joshua Azriel, First Amendment
Implications for E-Mail Threats: Are There Any Free Speech Protections? 23 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUT. & INFO. L. 845, 846 (2005)).
100. Black, 538 U.S. at 344; see also Jennifer Elrod, Expressive Activity,
True Threats, and the First Amendment, 36 CONN. L. REV. 541, 547 (2004).
101. Elrod, supra note 100, at 548–49.
102. Id. at 549.
103. Id. at 551.
104. Id. at 552. When an individual makes a true threat to another, the
recipient of the threat is coerced into taking or not taking action in which he
or she normally would or would not take. Id. An individual is fearful of the
ultimate consequence of not acting in a way consistent with their request. Id.
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experience the same psychological harm as any other free citizen
may experience.105 Threats of physical violence have been deemed
serious enough to cause a detrimental impact on a targeted individual and, therefore, should also be prohibited in the prison settings
because the victims are not free from such injury just because they
are incarcerated.106 Thus, threats of physical violence can rise to
the serious harm that is required to prevail on an Eighth Amendment violation claim.
Historically, courts prefer validating a claim for cruel and unusual punishment where the complainant has suffered a physical
injury.107 A physical injury might not be present immediately when
a prison official makes a verbal threat of physical violence. Because
there may very well be circumstances where an inmate’s physical
pain does not appear right away, courts should recognize the importance of an inmate’s psychological pain absent physical harm.
Threats of physical violence can lead to psychological and physical
harm108 and therefore should be considered part of the serious
harm required to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim.
B. Threats of Physical Violence Hold Minimal Penological
Purpose
In addition to the physical and psychological harm caused by
verbal threats of physical violence, there is very little penological
purpose to making such threats. The Eighth Amendment bars punishments that are “totally without penological justification.”109
When imprisoned, inmates retain the rights consistent with legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.110 The
Eighth Circuit has stated that “[s]ubjecting prisoners to . . . constant fear of such violence shocks modern sensibilities and serves
no legitimate penological purpose.”111
105. See id at 101.
106. Id. at 547.
107. See Bessler, supra note 77, at 33.
108. Id.
109. Kelsey D. Russell, Cruel and Unusual Construction: The Eighth
Amendment as a Limit on Building Prisons on Toxic Waste Sites, 165 UNIV. PA.
L. REV. 741, 750 (2017).
110. Id. at 753.
111. Irving v. Dormire, 519 F.3d 441, 449 (2008) (quoting Martin v. White,
742 F.2d 469, 474 (8th Cir. 1984)).
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There are limited circumstances where the use of verbal
threats of physical violence holds any penological purpose. One example of such circumstance is when the threats are made in order
to prevent a riot or “other major prison disturbance[s].”112 The use
of threats in this circumstance is necessary in order to keep the
prison staff and other inmates safe and free from potential harm.113
This Comment is not addressing these limited scenarios. Instead, this Comment addresses situations where a prison official
makes a threat to an individual inmate for reasons not relating to
retaining a safe prison environment. For instance, telling an inmate that he will be killed if he does not stop filing grievances, or if
he does not follow prison officials’ orders, does not serve any penological purpose.114 Thus, when making threats of verbal violence,
no legitimate purpose can be served by the prison official’s actions
because threats of physical violence do not further implement the
goals of the criminal justice system.
Courts should adopt the view that verbal threats of physical
harm rise to an Eighth Amendment violation. It is generally recognized that trauma can arise from psychological harm just the same
as physical harm.115 Moreover, the Supreme Court should find that
verbal threats of physical harm hold no legitimate, penological purpose. Until the Supreme Court takes up this issue, Circuit Courts
will be faced with the challenging task of continuing to make these
determinations independently.
C. Not All Threats of Physical Violence Violate the Eighth
Amendment
Some may argue that by recognizing threats made by prison
officials as a constitutional violation, the courts are creating a situation where any threat made by a prison official —regardless of how
serious they may be— can become an Eighth amendment violation.
As stated in Rhodes, the Constitution “does not mandate

112. Anya Emerson, Your Right to be Free from Assault by Prison Guards
and Other Prisoners, in COLUM. L. REV., A JAILHOUSE LAW.’S MANUAL, 736, 744
(12th ed. 2020).
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., Irving, 519 F.3d at 449.
115. See Babbel, supra note 79.
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comfortable prison.”116 Sometimes threats are needed to keep prisoners in line and keep prison officials and inmates safe. If prison
officials are unable to make any threats, prison officials will be limited in their tactics of controlling the prisoners within the prison,
potentially leading to dangerous prison conditions, such as riots.
However, adopting the four-factored analysis proposed below would
recognize that some threats fail to rise to an Eighth Amendment
violation and limit which claims are successful.
Courts often struggle with the objective element of an Eighth
Amendment claim; that is to say, Courts struggle with finding
whether a prison official was deliberately indifferent towards a substantial risk of harm to an inmate. Prison officials often show deliberate indifference by consciously disregarding the previous discussed physical and psychological harm that might result when
they make verbal threats of physical harm. Deliberate indifference
can be broken down into four elements: (1) the defendant knew of;
(2) a substantial risk; (3) of a serious harm; and (4) disregarded that
risk.117 The next part will propose a four-factor analysis for courts
to use in determining whether a prison official acted with deliberate
indifference.
IV. A PROPOSED FOUR-FACTOR ANALYSIS TO HELP GUIDE COURTS IN
DETERMINING WHICH THREATS RISE TO A CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION.

Currently, courts have not adopted a test to analyze what verbal threats of physical violence creates the substantial risk of serious harm required to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim. To
demonstrate a prison official acted deliberately indifferent, the inmate must show that the prison official was aware of a substantial
risk of serious harm and that the official “disregarded that risk by
failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.”118 Such analysis
is broad and gives very little guidance. A four-factor analysis will
help guide courts in their determination of whether a prison official’s threat of physical violence rises to the level of a substantial
risk of serious harm. The analysis also limits the possibility of

116. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981).
117. Calderón-Ortíz v. Laboy-Alvarado, 300 F.3d 60, 64 (1st Cir. 2002).
118. Substantive Rights Retained by Prisoners, supra note 92, at 1014.
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unfounded threats that do not cause psychological or physical harm
from being actionable.
A. The Four Factors
There are four factors courts should look to when deciding
whether a threat of physical violence rises to an Eighth Amendment
violation: (1) the repetitiveness of the threat; (2) the credibility of
the threat; (3) the subject matter of the threat; and (4) the context
of the threat. Courts should balance each factor against each other
to make an individualized determination as to whether there is a
constitutional violation. These factors are not determinative in
ones’ ability to prevail, and each factor should be balanced together.
A strong showing of one element balanced with a weak showing of
another may still be sufficient.
1.

Repetitiveness of the Threat

The first factor a court should look at is the repetitiveness of
the threat. While a single threat of physical violence could qualify
as a substantial risk of serious harm, courts have been hesitant to
recognize a verbal threat as cruel and unusual when the threat has
only occurred once.119 Very few courts have (perhaps cautiously)
concluded that a single occurrence, coupled with other oppressive
circumstances, can be sufficient to show a constitutional violation.120 However, repetitiveness of the threat is relevant because
repetitive threats can lead to long lasting psychological effects. By
continuously making conscious threats of physical violence, prison
officials are knowingly and willfully disregarding a substantial risk
of physical and psychological harm to the inmate which can lead to
more serious psychological harm as an inmate is faced with constant fear of danger.121

119. See, e.g., Williams v. Cassell, No. 3:17-cv-03039, 2017 WL 3396605, at
*2, (W.D. Ark. Aug 8, 2017). But see Irving v. Dormire, 519 F.3d 441, 449–50
(2008) (“The repeated. . . threats against Irving, if proved to be true, constituted brutal and wanton acts of cruelty that served no legitimate penological
purpose and poses a substantial risk of harm to Irving’s future health.”).
120. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843 (1994).
121. Delagran, supra note 81.
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The Court in Williams v. Cassell analyzed repetitiveness in its
decision.122 In Williams, the allegations stated a prison official
threatened the inmate by saying, “[i]f you don’t get a job, I will shoot
you in the face! If I have to work for a living, then you do too!”123
This was a single incident, and at no other point did the prison official make subsequent threats to the inmate.124 The Court held
this was not the type of conduct that is sufficient to state a constitutional claim because the threat only occurred once.125
In a scenario where the prison official makes one, although serious, singular threat, such threat may fail to meet the high standard of a “sufficiently serious” deprivation of a “substantial risk of
harm.”126 However, when prison officials make threats on multiple
occasions, courts should find the prison official acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of a serious harm because they
consciously made verbal threats on more than one occasion, and,
therefore, were aware of a substantial risk of an inmates physical
and mental health.127 Accordingly, consciously choosing to make
verbal threats on more than one occasion, knowing the damages it
can cause to an inmates health, should rise to acting with deliberate
indifference.
2.

Credibility of the Threat

In Northington v. Jackson, the court held that threats accompanied by conduct reinforcing the credibility of the threat may be
sufficient to support an Eighth Amendment claim.128 In Northington, a parole officer held a gun to a prisoner’s head while threatening to kill the prisoner.129 Because the verbal threat was coupled
with the actual means of carrying out the threat, the threat was

122. See generally Cassell, 2017 WL 3396605.
123. Id. at *1.
124. Id. at *2.
125. Id.
126. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 34 (1993).
127. One factor courts must consider is whether repetitive unfounded
threats lead to a lack of credibility. For example, if a prison official threatened
a prisoner daily that he will “beat him” yet not once has the prison official acted
upon that threat, one may argue that it is unreasonable to believe he will act
this time because he never acted upon previous threats.
128. See Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1522 (10th Cir. 1992).
129. Id.
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deemed credible and, therefore, could rise to the level of an Eighth
Amendment violation.130 Moreover, in Hudspeth v. Figgins, the
court found that “the combination of the guard’s threat and the prisoner’s subsequent transfer from unsupervised work to a work detail
supervised by armed guards sufficed to state a cause of action.”131
To assess credibility, courts should look to whether the prison
official has the actual means of carrying out their threat. For example, if a prison official threatens to shoot a prisoner yet the
prison official is unarmed, it would be unreasonable for the prisoner
to believe the threat was credible. On the other hand, when a prison
official is armed or brandishes their weapon, the official has clear
means to carry out the threat.132 The more credible the threat is,
the more likely the inmate is to perceive harm from the threat, damaging their physical and mental health. Thus, the more credible a
threat appears to be, the more likely it is an Eighth Amendment
violation.
3.

Subject Matter of the Threat

Next, courts should look at the subject matter of the threat.
The more heinous the threat, the more likely it is a court will find
that it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Threats of death
are the cruelest type of threats that prison officials can make. For
example, in Burton v. Livingston, a prison official pointed a gun at
the prisoner’s head and told him to run so the official had an excuse
to shoot him.133 The court held that “a prisoner retains at least the
right to be free from the terror of instant an unexpected death at
the whim of his. . . custodians.”134 Accordingly, prison officials cannot threaten inmates with death without violating the Eighth
Amendment.
On the other hand, in cases where the prison officials are
threatening an inmate with physical harm that is less than the
threat of death, the court should take that into consideration when
130. Id.
131. Chandler v. D.C. Dep’t of Corrections, 145 F.3d 1355, 1361 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (citing Hudspeth v. Figgins, 584 F.2d 1345, 1348 (4th Cir. 1978)).
132. See Burton v. Livingston, 791 F.2d 97, 100 (noting the prison official
“pointed a lethal weapon at the prisoner, cocked it, and threatened him with
instant death.”).
133. Id. at 99.
134. Id. at 100.
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determining whether the threat rises to an Eighth Amendment violation. In Irving, the court failed to find that the inmate’s Eighth
Amendment rights were violated when one prison official threatened to pepper spray him.135 Threatening to spray an inmate with
pepper spray is not as serious as threatening to kill or seriously
injure an inmate.136 The end result if the prison official carried out
the threat would differ greatly because in one scenario the inmate
will be suffering temporary physical pain, while in the other scenario, the inmate would be killed. Therefore, in situations where a
prison official is threatening an inmate with serious physical harm
or death, the court should weigh the threat more heavily than an
instance of simple physical violence.
4.

Context of Threat

Finally, courts should look at the overall context surrounding
the threats. Specifically, whether the threat was made in front of
other inmates or alone and whether the threat was made to all inmates or whether the threat was made directed towards just one
inmate. Context is essential in a court’s determination as to
whether the verbal threat of physical violence can constitute an
Eighth Amendment violation.
Courts should look at whether other people were present at the
time the threat was made.137 For example, in Williams, the Court
noted that four witnesses were present at the time the threat was
made.138 These four individuals witnessed the prison officials
threaten the inmate and were present throughout such acts.139 Because there were other people around when the threat was made,

135. Irving v. Dormire, 519 F.3d 441, 448 (8th Cir. 2008). Irving brought
various claims against multiple different defendants. Although the court found
an Eighth Amendment violation for other claims against other defendants, the
court failed to recognized Irving’s claim against one of the prison officials because it was objectively unreasonable.
136. See Emma Frankham, Use of Pepper Spray to “Fog” Inmates in Jail: A
National Trend? RACE, POL., JUST. (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.ssc.wisc.edu/
soc/racepoliticsjustice/2017/08/02/use-of-pepper-spray-to-fog-inmates-in-jail-anational-trend/ [https://perma.cc/KM8P-XBUF].
137. See generally Williams v. Cassell, No. 3:17-cv-03039, 2017 WL 3396605
(W.D. Ark. Aug 8, 2017).
138. Id. at *1.
139. See id.

136 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:1
the chances of the defendant acting upon the threat were slim to
none.140
Another circumstance worthy of consideration is whether the
threat was individualized to a specific inmate or whether it was
made to multiple individuals. In cases where a prison official
threatens an individual and that individual alone, one could argue
that it is objectively reasonable for that inmate to experience more
psychological harm. On the other hand, if multiple inmates receive
the same threat, then the chances of the threat being carried out is
very unlikely.
Lastly, a court should look to what led to the threat. A very
common reason why prison officials make threats of physical violence is to discourage inmates from seeking judicial relief.141 Because a prisoner has a right of access to courts, when threats are
made after an inmate attempts to seek judicial relief, the court
should not take this lightly.142 If courts ignore this, then a prisoner’s right to access the courts is being infringed upon as an inmate may be hesitant to seek redress which is a right guaranteed
under the First Amendment.143
B. An Application of the Four-Factored Analysis
Various courts have already used some of the above factors in
their reasoning. For example, the Eighth Circuit in Hopson v. Frederickson, determined no Eighth Amendment violation occurred after looking at some of the various factors explained above.144 First,
the court looked to the subject matter of the verbal threat and
stated the subject matter of the threat here did not rise to a violation because the officer just threatened to “knock [Hopson’s]

140. Id. at *2.
141. See Irving v. Dormire, 519 F.3d 441, 445 (8th Cir. 2008).
142. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment of the Constitution states
that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.” Id. (emphasis added). In the prison context, a prisoner still retains his right to access the courts. Likewise, inmates have a right
to be free from retaliation if he chooses to seek judicial redress. See id.
143. Id.
144. Hopson v. Fredrickson, 961 F.2d 1374, 1379 (8th Cir. 1992).
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remaining teeth out” if he failed to speak.145 Such violence, while
reprehensible, is undeniably a far cry from the threat made in Burton, where prison officials threatened to kill the prisoner.146
Next, the court considered the credibility of the threat.147
Here, Hopson was located in the back seat of a police car and the
defendants were in the front seat.148 It was unlikely that the defendants would have the ability to knock the prisoners’ teeth out
when the officers were driving, and Hopson was in the backseat.149
Then the Court looked to the repetitiveness prong. This was a single occasion and the plaintiff failed to point to any other instances
of “brutal” and “wanton act[s] of cruelty.”150 Finally, the Court
looked to the context of the verbal threat noting that not once did
Hopson allege that he was physically assaulted by the officer or that
the officer “raised his fists or made any type of physical gesture to
him.”151
The court adequately took into consideration the various factors proposed in order to determine whether Hopson’s claim raised
an Eighth Amendment violation and ultimately found it did not.152
Thus, if other courts followed this approach, only claims that truly
rise to an Eighth Amendment violation will be provided relief.
Moreover, the Supreme Court should find there is a constitutional
violation here because doing so will create clearly established law
required to preclude a governmental official from being shielded
from liability under qualified immunity.

145. Id. at 1378.
146. Id. at 1378–79.
147. See generally id.
148. Id. It is unknown as to whether there was any form of safety protection
barrier commonly seen in police vehicles between the front and back seats. If
there was a physical barrier, it would surely strengthen the Court’s holding
that the threat lacked credibility.
149. See generally id.
150. Id. at 1379.
151. Id.
152. Id. (holding that “Officer Thomure’s alleged conduct failed to rise to
the level of a ‘brutal’ and ‘wanton’ act of cruelty.”).
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C. The Adoption of the Four-Factored Analysis Will Help Guide
Courts and Would Allow the Supreme Court to Recognize Threats
of Physical Violence as an Eighth Amendment Violation, Which is
Essential for Inmates to Bring Suit and Overcome Qualified
Immunity.
Qualified immunity “shield[s] [government officials] from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”153 Often, prison officials are
not liable for their actions due to qualified immunity.154 When a
right is clearly established and a governmental official violates that
right, the official risks being held personally liable for the actions
they take.155 Qualified immunity often precludes an individual
from prevailing on a claim. In respect to verbal threats of physical
harm, circuits have been split on the issue for more than two decades. Currently, because the majority of courts have yet to recognize a claim, many inmates go without remedy simply because they
fail to have the opportunity to bring suit. Thus, it is essential that
the Supreme Court finds threats of physical violence as a constitutional violation to permit inmates to bring suit.
The recognition of a legal claim is crucial, but is only the first
step to overcoming qualified immunity. In this situation, having no
clear and established law, prison officials can and are regularly getting away with threatening inmates without any repercussions. There is no doubt that the right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment is clearly established, but the extent of what
constitutes “cruel and unusual” has long been debated. Such right
to be free from verbal threats of physical violence from prison officials will not be clearly established until the Supreme Court takes
up the question or until there is a consensus amongst all circuits.
By holding that verbal threats of physical harm are a violation of
one’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment, qualified immunity will no longer shield prison officials of their true threats and these prison officials will face the

153. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
154. See Crow v. Montgomery, 403 F.3d 598, 601 (8th Cir. 2005); see also
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 139 (1979).
155. Crow, 403 F.3d at 602.
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consequences of their conscious acts of making verbal threats of
physical violence to inmates.
CONCLUSION

If courts recognize verbal threats of physical violence and use
the above factors, individuals such as Avion Lawson, who was
threatened with physical violence for filing grievances and complaints, may be able to prevail on a claim of cruel and unusual punishment.156 The prison officials made a verbal threat of physical
violence just two weeks before Lawson was brutally attacked by
other inmates.157 A court may find that making a threat of physical
violence constituted an Eighth Amendment violation.
Verbal threats of physical violence should constitute an Eighth
Amendment violation because prison officials act deliberately indifferent when making threats and by doing so, they disregard a serious risk of physical or psychological harm to the prisoner. In order
to prevent threats from being labeled “cruel and unusual,” courts
should look to factors such as repetitiveness of the threats, credibility of the threat, subject matter of the threat, and the context surrounding when the threat was made. By doing so, this will limit
the number of threats prevailing while protecting the rights of the
incarcerated and will solve the circuit split creating the clearly established law needed to prevent prison officials from being shielded
from liability under qualified immunity.

156. See Lawson v. McGee, No. 19-81526-CV-RUIZ, 2020 WL 5822266, at
*1 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 28, 2020).
157. Id. at *5.

